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IN THE MAKING OF AGRARIAN CAPITALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
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In recent times there has been an upsurge in debate over rural matters amongst scholars of 
South Africa, characterized by sharply differing theoretical and methodological approaches 
and not a little vituperation. In a sense this is a welcome and inevitable development, 
triggered by the publication of a number of rural studies penned by academic historians. [l] 
The 1980s have been characterized by the rise of a "new social history" of industrial South 
Africa which has borne rich fruits, much of which has retained an implicit concern with 
larger structural questions, but much of which has tended to draw attention away from issues 
of political economy and has become a substitute for engagement with fundamental political 
and theortetical questions. But what has emerged recently has been a recrystallization of 
conflicts between those loosely (and not necessarily accurately) defined as structuralists, 
whose primary concern has been with questions of theory, and those who have been 
characterized (equally loosely) as "social historians". 
It is perhaps inevitable that these schisms have been revived by consideration of rural history, 
for it is in the conceptualization of agrarian transformations that we might begin to reopen 
central issues relating to the way we interpret South Africa's past, and also by extension its 
present and its future. South Africa unquestionably has undergone over the course of this 
century an industrial revolution, and the economic, social and political aspects of that 
industrial revolution have received a great deal of attention. But accumulation and class 
formation in the pre-industrial colonial economy are still little understood, and rural 
transformations in the industrial age have also until recently been very sketchily and 
unsatisfactorily investigated. My contention is that it is in understanding longer-term 
dynamics of rural change that we are likely to proceed further in our macro-explanations of 
South Africa's peculiar political economy. 
Of course, it is important to reach beyond the parochialism that still tends to bedevil South 
African historiography; but the question arises of what might be the appropriate comparative 
framework for approaching South African agrarian studies. For the most part, theoretical 
considerations of these matters have been marked by Eurocentrism. Much criticism of the 
rural historians has referred back to the work of Mike Morris as the bench-mark against 
which more recent work must be measured and in relation to which it has been found 
wanting. [2] It is thus perhaps necessary to re-examine briefly Morris's approach before 
proceeding to more substantive issues. I do this not in a spirit of sectarianism but in the 
belief that the conceptual inadequacies of past work (my own included) must be the starting 
point from which new starts can be made. 
Morris's Eurocentric foundations lead to some dubious conclusions when applied to South 
Africa. [3] He uses analyses of the European transition from feudalism to capitalism as the 
bases of his explication of transition in South Africa. Thus he posits a transition from a 
"semi-feudal", "squatter peasantry" who paid rent, "either cash, kind or, sometimes, labour 
rent" (p 293), the latter corresponding to "feudal corvee labour", "completely bound in a serf- 
like manner to the soil" (296). In this semi-feudal economy, in which production was limited 
and not oriented toward exchange, we are told, this free labour service was typically given 
for two days a week throughout the year and tenants' own oxen and implements were used. 
A capitalist mode of production emerged out of this semi-feudal system, becoming dominant, 
says Morris, by the second decade of the century. Thus by the 1920s "continuous yearly 
bondage" no longer operated. Service was now continuous for three to four months of the 
year, and landlords' oxen and implements were now used on landlords' fields - and also 
frequently on tenants' plots as well. This form of labour tenancy, according to Morris, (in 
contrast to the preceding "feudal c m e e  labour") was equivalent to the wage form (albeit 
paid predominantly in kind) (303). He thus sees this transformation as leading to greater 
mobility for tenants, as tenants now could sell their labour elsewhere for wages during a 
considerable proportion of the year: they were no longer "totally bonded ... to the landlord 
for the whole year" (305). Furthermore, the union of the direct producer with the means of 
labour had now been severed - they now belonged to the employers, and the tenants set them 
in motion under the organizational control of the employers. Morris quotes Lenin in 
stressing the centrality of who owns the means of production in distinguishing between 
"capitalist labour service and feudal labour service". 
All this is a convincing exposition of the essential conceptual difference between feudal and 
capitalist property relations, drawn from work that has European transitions as their point of 
departure, but it has little to do with what actually happened in South Africa, and Morris 
makes little effort to provide evidence to suggest that it did. The only evidence that Morris 
has for this idealized picture of South African feudalism is the work of Lenin, Hindess and 
Hirst, and Poulantzas. I would suggest that his Eurocentric approach is inadequate, and 
misrepresents both the nature of pre-capitalist rural relations and the significance of the 
transformation to capitalism. Not least, Eurocentricity suggests an inevitability about the 
emergence of capitalist relations (whether this took place "from above" or "from below"). In 
this it resembles a kind of Marxist variant of modernization theory. Indeed, there are distinct 
strains of dualism in Morris's analysis (semi-feudal production equals production for use; 
capitalist production emerges with the emergence of a market economy). It is because 
Morris assumes that South Africa has autonomously and autochthonously followed a variant 
of a universal model of transformation that he can plaintively ask: If capitalist relations were 
not dominant in agriculture by the 1920s, what was the ruling class, what was the form of the 
state? - implying that, if capitalist relations were not dominant in agriculture, then the ruling 
class and the state must have been pre-capitalist in character. [4] 
South Africa cannot be isolated from the uneven and combined history of capitalism as a 
world system in this way, as if it has simply replicated earlier European transformations and 
not been formed in structural relation to them. In the non-European world, capitalism was 
manifested as an alien imposition and was initially experienced through the mediation and 
domination of merchant capital. In short, the problem of capitalist transformation in this 
colonial context is qualitatively different - a transformation of rural relationships in a setting 
which had already, been penetrated and conquered by capital, first merchant capital and then 
advanced industrial capital in the form of monopolistic mining industry. Further, the view 
from the "underdeveloped" world suggests strongly that this transformation to a capitalist 
rural class structure needs to be problematized. There was nothing inevitable about it. Why, 
indeed, did such a transformation take place in South Africa? 
In short, the whole problem needs to be retheorized. Getting back to theoretical basics, 
Morris is quite right to seek the points at which capitalist production becomes predominant, 
and his theorization (following Lenin) of the capitalist nature of certain forms of tenancy is 
convincing. [6] There is more than a mere formal significance in the transition to capitalist 
relations in agriculture, for it is only with generalized commodity production, when labour 
itself becomes a commodity, that the extraction of relative surplus value becomes possible, 
that is the continual tendancy for labour productivity to be increased through the 
development of the forces of production. [6] When the direct producers (the peasantry) still 
control the means of production and set them in motion, surplus appropriation takes extra- 
economic forms and wealth remains external to the processes of production. Hence the 
revolutionary historical significance of the moment when capital lays hold of production and 
sets about ceaselessly transforming the conditions of production themselves. It is at that 
moment that capitalist transformation takes place. 
However, any consideration of how capital invaded the colonial world requires a 
consideration of the nature of merchant capital. Clearly, merchant capital predated the rise 
of capitalism as a mode of production. [7] Prior to the emergence of capitalism, merchants 
enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in their activities stretching across the world, operating 
outside the realm of production. [g] But a qualitative change in the nature of exchange 
relations resulted from the break-through to capitalism in western Europe. Global exchange 
relations were subordinated on an ever-widening and more intensive scale to the reproductive 
needs of industrial capital. [g] It was during the nineteenth century, in particular, that these 
transformations were fully manifested. Industrial capitalism (initially English), using 
merchant capital as its vector and its agent, set about infiltrating and subordinating societies 
in every corner of the globe. New sources of raw materials and new markets were sought, 
and new fields for capital investment were conquered. Merchant capital became 
subordinated to the operations of industrial capital, and became its tool, its handmaiden, in its 
ever-widening assaults on the non-capitalist world. Merchants, the advance guard of this 
expanding field of capitalist penetration, found themselves being squeezed out and their 
functions changed as industrial capital followed merchant capital out of its home base into 
far-flung corners of the globe. 
In its role as the tool of industrial capital, mexhant capital has played an anomalous and 
contradictory role worldwide. Despite its innate conservatism, its parasitic quality, it has 
indirectly had a revolutionary impact in reorienting, transforming, or strengthening the pre- 
capitalist systems it has penetrated, and in spawning new productive systems based on non- 
capitalist productive relationships. This is the anomaly to which the Genoveses have 
pointed: "capitalism, which rested on free labour and had no meaning apart from it, not only 
conquered, absorbed, and reinforced servile labour systems throughout the world; it created 
new ones, including systems of chattel slavery, on an unprecedented social scale and at an 
unprecedented level of violence". [l01 Thus capitalism spawns and sustains, in a state of 
dependence, different non-capitalist productive systems, all structured under the mediation of 
merchant capital, all participating in the processes of development of capitalism as an 
integrated, articulated world order. [l l] 
But the shape of these subordinate productive systems was not determined solely by the 
operations of merchant capital. Their precise shape was defined by the local dynamics of 
struggle and class formation. Colonial ruling classes which arose on the back of merchant 
capital tended to pursue their own class interests, which were not reducible to the merchant 
capital that had spawned them. Indigenous pre-capitalist social and political forces that 
predated the rise of industrial capital also had their own internal dynamics. Indeed, over 
large areas of the tropics, what is remarkable is the limited extent of capitalist impact in 
reshaping indigenous formations. Much recent Marxist writing on Africa, for example, in 
sharp contradiction to the universal teleologies of the 1960s and 1970s, such as 
underdevelopment theory, takes as its starting point the weakness and inefficacy of the 
imperial impact, and the failures of metropolitan capital to infiltrate fully, and thereby to 
restructure, pre-capitalist formations. [l21 
This discussion of conceptual issues provides a framework for the analysis of agrarian South 
Africa. What was the nature of the order that was being created in South Africa under the 
dominance of merchant capital prior to the mineral revolution of the late nineteenth century? 
The impact of merchant capital was, regionally, extremely uneven. Certain areas in the older 
colonies closer to colonial ports were integrated early on into international commercial 
networks, and thus developed their own specialized economies and labour systems (capitalist 
as well as non-capitalist). Elsewhere, regions further north and further inland were inhabited 
by indigenous cultivators who fiercely resisted dispossession and displacement, and (from 
the 1830s) by white pastoralists. Here merchant capital infiltrated very unintensively . 
Although indigenous groups, their division of labour and patterns of accumulation and 
differentiation were being reoriented as new trading networks developed, no radically new 
systems of commercial production were set up before the last years of the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, it was in the high veld region of the interior that South Africa's industrial 
revolution was to take place and where the nual economy and rural relations were radically 
to be transformed in keeping with the demands of the rapidly increasing home market, from 
the 1870s onward. In the process, the high veld was to become the agricultural heartland of 
industrial South Africa. 
From the early days of settlement, the settlers and other independent groups thrown up by the 
settler society, most notably the Griqua, were forward representatives of merchant capital in 
their trading and transporting activities - unspecialized, under-capitalized, ad hoc and part- 
time perhaps, but involved in supplying markets with a range of commodities (ivory, skins, 
cattle, wool, etc) often acquired from indigenous pre-capitalist societies. They were also 
involved from early days rather more directly in their own forms of primitive accumulation - 
looting and raiding for labour and livestock , undertaking military adventures (in the 
nineteenth century often riding on the back of imperial power) for the purpose of 
dispossession and land alienation. The processes of primitive accumulation moved 
sporadically further inland during the nineteenth century, developing in intensity in one 
region and then in another. [l31 Thus processes of military dispossession at work in the 
eastern Cape beginning prior to the Great Trek are to be seen north of the Orange in the 
1850s and 1860s, and in the 1870s they spread out dramatically on the back of a newly 
rampant imperialism after the discovery of diamonds, resulting in the subversion and 
conquest of virtually all independent chiefdoms throughout the subcontinent by the end of 
the century. These processes corresponded to different phases in the penetration of capital, 
developing quite slowly during the period of dominance of merchant capital (itself formed by 
the changing nature of metropolitan industrial capitalism) and speeding up dramatically as 
industrial capital invaded the subcontinent in the last third of the nineteenth century. 
In pre-industrial South Africa there was no readily identifiable, mature, dominant set of 
productive relationships. A variety of forms of labour coercion and control (including 
slavery) were spawned by merchant capital in a situation in which labour in sufficient 
quantities was not sufficiently divorced from the means of production to constitute a viable 
wage labour force. Production was based on slavery, clientship, indenture, debt bondage, 
etc. Much of this can hardly be identified as capitalist; but at the same time wage 
relationships were widespread, in some areas predominant, particularly after the abolition of 
slavery. Throughout the sheep-farming districts of the Cape interior, Khoi labour was 
thoroughly proletarianized, even if subject to non-economic coercion. Throughout the areas 
of white settlement, also, African migrants searching for wages in order to acquire livestock, 
firearrns and other European commodities, were widely employed on farms from at least the 
third decade of the nineteenth century onward. [l41 Even the "tenancy" relations which were 
established by Boers who pushed into the areas of African settlement on the high veld and 
beyond, which Morris characterizes as semi-feudal, as comsponding to "feudal corvee 
laboury' in which tenants were supposedly "completely bound in a serf-like manner to the 
soil", were, more realistically, arrangements based on greater or lesser degrees of reciporcity 
or coercion whereby elders in independent black communities essentially outside the colonial 
economy entered into arrangements for the deployment of junior members in lineage 
societies. 
In fact, it would be wrong to assume that rights to landed property and authority over those 
living on it were established and clear-cut. In the interior regions where whites sought to 
establish claims to land on which black agriculturalists lived or on to which they 
subsequently moved, there was an ongoing struggle to turn formal rights (only recognized in 
the coloniser's law) into control over the indigenous peoples. Landownership itself passed 
through different phases. For a long time, ownership rights to land granted by colonial states 
bore little direct relationship to the occupation or exploitation of the land. Most land in all 
new regions wherever colonial states extended their sway in the nineteenth century (no 
matter how tenuously at first) was speculatively owned by merchant and finance capital; and 
land was widely used as a form of state patronage and compensation for services. A close 
correlation also existed between public office and landownership. [l51 On the other hand, 
the Boer economy was not closely tied to landownership, which was not necessary for 
independence as a pastoralist or for access to labour on a modest scale. Non-ownership of 
land was not a disabling economic disadvantage in settler society until late in the nineteenth 
century, when formal land rights were becoming more closely synchronized with class 
membership, and non-landowners began to sink to proletarian status. [l61 
We can see the "pre-history" of capitalism in the activities of Boer accumulators who 
operated alongside independent black peoples in these interior regions. What emerges is as 
1 wide a variety of forms of surplus appropriation, tribute-taking, mercantile enterprise, and 
downright looting as can be imagined in frontier regions of colonial settlement. Of crucial 
importance was control over the instruments of the local state. Administrative, judicial, 
policing and military functions were commonly integrated. Thus Abel Erasmus in the 
I eastern Transvaal and C J de Villiers in the north-eastern Orange Free State (to name two 
examples who have been subjected to examination) [l71 struck alliances of convenience with 
l local black chiefs, enabling them to exact tribute in labour and cattle through mixtures of 
coercion and reciprocity, combining also the exaction of rent in their capacities as land 
barons over land which they owned or over which they claimed to be agents, with the levying 
I of tax (often arbitrarily) in their capacity as local state functionaries (albeit with very loosely 
defined duties and rights). Both Erasmus and de Villiers benefited from hunting game (de 
Villiers exacting half the booty in return for issuing passes for this activity). In de Villiers's 
case, institutional power was combined with a sharp eye for land fraud. The land over which 
they exercised their authority included land owned by absentees as well as African-occupied 
land not yet alienated but over which the colonial state claimed to exercise some degree of 
dominion. Of course, the extent to which this authority was exercised was determined by the 
size and cohesion of the black communities: certainly, the stronger black chiefdoms could 
up to a certain point hold the balance of regional power vis-h-vis white settlers before the 
mineral discoveries brought a renewed injection of imperial military muscle to bear. 
Such accumulators were also men of war, holding military office in the Boer commando 
l system and occasionally leading local commandos in war against independent African 
1 peoples in search of booty. On top of all this they were also usually very consi&rable cattle 
l farmers. If this was clearly not yet a capitalist economy, there was also nothing feudal about 
l it. If we are to characterize it at all, we would have to see it as a frontier economy being 
l 
l 
shaped under the dominance of merchant capital, operating very unintensively on the 
margins of the world capitalist economy. Black communities were being penetraterd and 
reoriented and often brought within the orbit of tributary relations; but the fundamentals of 
their independent economic systems were still intact. Surplus appropriation before the late 
nineteenth century was sporadic and arbitrary. Most of the black population, whether they 
lived on land which was owned by whites or not, were as yet very marginally integrated into 
new productive relationships under the authority of the colonisers. 
l 
I As internal markets grew and transport facilities improved in the final decades of the 
I 
nineteenth century, so opportunities for investment in productive enterprise (by black and 
white alike) intensified - as they had at an earlier date in more export-oriented regions nearer 
the coast. Older forms of accumulation faded. Closer white settlement and more intense 
exploitation of the soil to feed the new mining communities brought greatly heightened 
l pressure to bear on black agriculturists. Through the higher-lying arable regions of Natal, the 
Orange Free State and Transvaal, these transformations were under way in the 1870s after 
the first substantial concentrations of industrial capital on the Diamond Fields had 1 dramatically increased markets for rural produce in the interior regions, and had brought an 
I influx of money capital for productive and speculative purposes alike. The extraction of tribute from African societies greatly intensified, and at the same time their dispossession and 
the expropriation of their resources began to be pursued with unprecedented vigour. But 
further afield, in much of the area north of the Vaal, older forms of accumulation persisted 
much longer. Thus the local processes of primitive accumulation themselves evolved, 
corresponding to different phases in the development of merchant capital as a structuring 
force. 
The consequence of processes of primitive accumulation as they developed in pre-industrial 
South Africa was the rise of accumulating settler elites of the sort we have described 
(although their rise did not yet add up to capitalist class formation); and the rise of settler 
elites implied also the rise of settler state structures. At an earlier date in the eighteenth- 
century Cape Colony there would have been a tendency for differentiation in trekboer society 
to be dissipated in a display of conspicuous consumption. The development of merchant 
capital as the ultimate structuring force in settler society had to have reached a certain point 
before processes of primitive accumulation could yield an accumulating elite, and before that 
accumulating elite could begin to build state structures to legitimize and sustain their 
activities. Eastern Cape separatism in the nineteenth century was, arguably, one 
manifestation. [l81 The process was clearly to be seen in the rise of the Orange Free State 
Republic as a direct successor to the colonial state that gave it birth in 1854, and in the more 
gradual emergence of foci of state formation north of the Vaal, especially in the south- 
western Transvaal. [l91 The Boer republics were, in a sense, offshoots of British informal 
imperialism. Indeed, they were at times and in places engines of primitive accumulation 
geared to the succouring and sustaining of colonial ruling classes emerging on the margins of 
the expanding capitalist economy of the nineteenth century, with its epicentre in Britain. l 
Although they were relatively weak, these colonial states, in their expansive phases, were l 
concerned to legitimize white land claims at the expense of black agriculturists, issuing title l 
to unalienated land on a massive scale for speculative purposes, providing a legal system 
l 
(albeit still usually quite ineffective) for the control of labour and the extension of a 
commercial system, seeking opportunities to make war with a view to shaking free black l 
land and labour for more "efficient" purposes, and imposing boundary lines that constituted l 
large-scale alienation of land on which blacks lived (although it was a different matter to turn 1 
paper boundaries into actual authority over such black people and control over their labour 
power). 
It is out of these processes of primitive accumulation and state formation, also, that a state- 
initiated and state-sustained political economy of racial supremacy began to emerge in the 
interior regions of pre-industrial South Africa. The racial exclusiveness (if that is what it 
was) of the Boer economy and society did not imply a systematic capacity to dominate, 
subjugate or dispossess on a large scale (although those impulses were there from the start). 
Indeed, blacks such as the Griqua indulged in their own early forms of accumulation: these 
were not racially exclusive processes. It was only when primitive accumulation (and thus 
also the emergence of colonial elites and local state structures built on such accumulation) 
had reached a certain point of development that these impulses were translated into a full- 
scale ideology of racial supremacy, not only on the parochial level of the farm or the 
homestead but at the level of state policy, and not only in relation to those directly 
incorporated in the settler economy but also in relation to entire populations. [20] Black 
communities were expropriated and dispossessed as emergent white elites, using the power 
of the emergent local state, were able to accumulate resources at their expense. This process 
of primitive accumulation was, for example, very clearly to be seen in the wars against the 
Basotho between 1851 and 1868. 
However, the processes of primitive accumulation might never have yielded a fully capitalist 
agriculture in the interior regions, given the absence of any single export product of sufficient 
value to merchant capital to give birth to a fully fledged, mature and export-oriented 
productive system (whether capitalist or not). By the turn of the century, however, the 
mineral revolution had occurred, which in turn had created a home market for agricultural 
produce unparalleled in Africa. But even so, the processes of primitive accumulation were 
not to be completed for a long while yet, for not only did colonial land claims have to be 
turned into de facto control over the land by individual owners and lessees (a process that 
could not be taken for granted) but a labouring force had to be forged out of those pre- 
capitalist agriculturists living on the land. If colonial land rights were largely c o n f i e d  in 
fact as well as in colonial law in the early twentieth century (at the same time as the 
remaining areas of independent black settlement were being brought under state authority 
and being transformed into "reserves"), the struggle to disposses blacks on alienated land 
and subjugate them in the interests of capital accumulation proper was to last a lot longer. 
Primitive accumulation in this particular context implies a particular process of struggle, that 
cannot be reduced to the notion of a struggle between classes fully formed. A working class 
had to be created from a population which was still in large degree external to the emergent 
productive system. Of course, at the same time there were (and always had been) struggles 
over specifically class issues being fought - struggles over remuneration, working conditions, 
etc. But, in the early twentieth century, these struggles were still subsidiary to the struggles 
for primitive accumulation and against dispossession through much of rural South Africa. 
African agriculturists, even when living on land to which whites held legal title, did not 
necessarily recognize such title nor the exercise of control or surplus appropriation that such 
title sought to legitimize. Their struggles against dispossession often took the form of 
resistance against excessive commoditization of their peasant production itself - against the 
commercialization inherent in sharecropping relationships, for instance. Keeping markets at 
arm's length also meant keeping surplus appropriation by alien colonizers at arm's length. 
This, in part, meant a determination to maintain herding as the basis of their economy and the 
main means of access to markets, in the face of efforts to turn them into intensive 
commercial cultivators, to the profit of white landlords. [21] 
Such struggles typically revolved around the structure of the African community. Wherever 
the grid of white landownership was laid, black people fought to maintain intact the 
extended, kin-based, multi-generational community as the fundamental unit of production 
and of social life in their lineage system. White landholders, on the other hand, were sooner 
or later bound, as large landholdings were subdivided, as land became a scarcer and more 
valuable resource, and as market production intensified, to seek to displace and break up such 
communities and their often considerable stock holdings. The elders of such communities (at 
an earlier date crucial allies in directing and controlling the labour of juniors), often became 
foci of resistance against the dispossession of productive resources such as livestock and 
against the alienation of more and more labour power from within the tenant communities. 
Indeed, Bradford demonstrates that in the 1920s a strong peasant consciousness still 
informed black struggles on the land (that is, access to land and other productive resources 
was of greater importance than proletarian class issues such as remuneration), and she 
demonstrates that this is crucial in understanding the whole dynamic of capital accumulation 
on the land at this time. [22] 
The nature of rural struggles also had its effect on the nature of political struggles more 
generally. African nationalism, in its earliest phases, was very concerned with the land 
question, and the early educated elite was very often concerned to forge alliances with chiefs, 
as the embodiment of communal land rights in their struggles. [23] In the process, in the 
early twentieth century a degree of ethnicity-building was indulged in by black people, 
politicians, chiefs and peasaants alike - not least on the farms - in their attempts to legitimize 
land claims, according to rules laid down by the white state (for example, in the 1913 Natives 
Land Act). Hence the ideological ambiguities of early African nationalism: the mix of 
national and class elements, the bonding of new elites and "traditional" authorities, the 
striving for super-ethnic identity while struggling for protection of "tribal" resources and 
political institutions. The nature of rural struggles also explains in some degree the 
ambiguities of black attitudes toward segregation as a repressive and as an apparently 
potentially liberating dogma, reflected in the fact that many saw the Land Act as having 
possibilities for the reclamation of land lost through conquest. [24] 
Merchant capital itself was being transformed with the influx of industrial capital. The 
former lost its relative independence and became a subordinate adjunct to the latter. 
Previously merchant capital, with its base - its sources of credit and finance - in Britain, was 
relatively colour-blind, battening on to non-capitalist productive systems whereever it could 
find them and setting new ones in motion to service metropolitan needs. But it now became 
directly subservient to the drive for a racially exclusive industrial order. [25] Thus the 
independent black commercial peasantry of the eastern Cape, for example, who had for a 
time been incorporated into the political processes of the Cape Colony in collaboration with 
their merchant patrons, found themselves now in an increasingly friendless and predatory 
world. [26] 
But what were the actual transformations taking place on the farms in the wake of the 
mineral revolution? First, the extraction of absolute surplus value through extra-economic 
means characterized rural relations through much of the agricultural heartlaiid right through 
the first half of the century. Thus the conquest by capital over indigenous agriculturists 
living on the farms, their initial integration into the capitalist economy, took the form of the 
increasingly intensive commoditization of their peasant production and the increasingly 
efficient siphoning off of their surpluses as an essential source of profit to landholders, rather 
than their outright dispossession and the expropriation of their productive resources. Family 
structure changed radically as extended, kin-based communities - the essential element in 
their lineage economies - broke up and were replaced by much smaller and more atomized 
family units, which were more vulnerable to landlord exactions. In the process, peasant 
society for a time became more differentiated as some took advantage of new opportunities 
for accumulation and greatly expanded their productive base, investing in educaiton and 
developing new forms of class consciousness. But this was a transitional phase and was not 
sustained. Rather, landlord control over their means of production and over their labour was 
steadily intensified. The direct producers, in consequence, experienced diminishing 
economic manoeuvrability and fewer and fewer options. Impoverishment was the long-term, 
inevitable consequence. 
Thus rent tenancy (most obviously at first in the form of sharecropping) was enormously 
intensified, both in terms of the absolute output of agricultural commodities and in terms of 
the surpluses appropriated by landlords, as a result of the commercialization of the 
countryside. Of course, at the same time capitalist production was also intensifying as 
finance capital became more readily available and new settlers arrived in larger and larger 
numbers. The two developments were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they often occurred 
together on the same tenantry, some being able to maintain (and for a time extend) their 
viability as tenant producers more successfully than others. But capitalist production 
remained stunted and fragile (as in other settler economies in Africa) until state-initiated 
mechanization revolutionized the productivity of agriculture after the Second World War. 
Appropriation of absolute surplus value, in which capital subsumed labour in only a formal 
sense and stopped short of taking hold of production and directly transforming it, was 
maintained as long as the productive technology at the disposal of landlords was essentially 
the same as that at the disposal of tenants - namely ox traction and manual harvesting. There 
was nothing in this technology which required capitalist transformation, nor was it apparent 
that capitalist transformation would greatly increase productivity or profits in the absence of 
access to more advanced technology. However, since the 1940s all major productive 
processes have been mechanized, firstly and most importantly with the coming of the motor 
tractor, and capitalist production has ousted the peasantry as a significant factor in 
commercial farming. [27] 
Capitalist transformation in South Africa did follow certain familiar patterns: it took place 
"from above", in a late-industrializing economy in which capitalism arrived ready-made in 
the form of large-scale industrial production, with a strong state exercising heavy extra- 
economic coercion over a peasantry being transformed into a proletariat. It is the existence 
of these patterns that has led to the use of the well known Prussian analogy by some 
scholars. [28] The Prussian model has validity for the analysis presented here if one analyses 
east-Elbian Germany (and eastern Europe more generally) historically as a colonial 
dependency of capitalist western Europe, and hence being shaped by forces of external 
capitalist expansion (albeit at an earlier date) similar to those in other parts of the colonial 
world (such as Latin America - or South Africa). Indeed, Laclau has made just such an 
analogy in pointing to the phenomenon whereby heavily settled, marginal regions 
experienced a strengthening of servile relations to increase production for markets (e.g. the 
second serfdom of eastern Europe). [29] 
This approach is quite unlike Morris's, for he sees "semi-feudal" relations as being 
characterized by production for use rather than for exchange, the implication being that 
capitalist relations emerge with the commercialization of production and integration into 
capitalist markets. [30] But, if one sees such economies as being structured by an external 
and invading capitalism through the mediation of merchant capital (rather than as 
autonomous and autochthonous variants of a universal model of capitalist transformation 
established initially in Europe), then one, arguably, begins to see the true significance of the 
recurring patterns that have been noted. The haciendas of Latin America, the nineteenth- 
century seigneurial economy of east-Elban Germany, and (on a much smaller scale and over 
a dramatically shortened time-scale) the sharecropping economy on the South African high 
veld in the twentieth century, can be seen as different types of non-capitalist, highly 
commercialized productive systems, extracting absolute surplus value and employing extra- 
economic forms of surplus appropriation, all dependent on and subsidiary to metropolitan 
capitalism. [31] That is the real significance of the Prussian model, and that is why capitalist 
transformations (where they wcursed) in these situations have shown such structural 
similarities. 
Why did capitalist transformation eventually take place? The intrusion of advanced 
industrial capital into regions which, in terms of rural class structure, were largely non- 
capitalist did not imply that a process of capitalist class formation in agriculture would 
inevitably be fully carried through; and, indeed, the failure of such rural transformations is a 
central index of underdevelopment in the late twentieth century. A glance at Latin America 
will illustrate the point; and it is now abundantly evident that incipient capitalist farming in 
other parts of Africa (such as that which settlers tried to establish) has mainly been marked 
by stagnation, failure and ineffectuality. [32] 
Wherein lies South Africa's particularity? The answer might lie in comparative study of 
Latin American countries - Chile, for instance, also a country in which the first influx of 
industrial capital took the form of mining enterprise, and which came to incorporate large 
numbers of pre-capitalist agriculturists as a dominated and dispossessed class in the process 
of state formation. In Chile, the families who owned the land also controlled the state. 
Agriculture was stagnating by the end of the nineteenth century, and Chile was becoming a 
food importer. An abundant and ill-paid labour force was locked into primitive technology at 
the same time as grain production elsewhere (in the USA, Australia, and later Argentina) was 
becoming mechanized. There was no shortage of capital and credit available to these 
politically powerful landowners - in part kom the nitrate revenues of the state. But rather 
than invest in rural production, they channelled funds massively into mining enterprise both 
in Chile and in neighbouring Bolivia. Denoon comments: "Landowners could regard 
stagnant rural production with equanimity: the purpose of owning land was not to extract 
wealth from it, but to control the mass of the rural population, and to provide access to state 
revenues." Thus, he concluded: "the expansion of mining had entrenched, rather than 
shaken, the political control of the landowning bourgeoisie, providing larger incomes through 
opportunities of mining investment, and exempting landowners from the need to transform 
rural society in order to increase rural production." [33] The question to be asked is: Why 
were the class interests of the (extremely prosperous) ruling oligarchy in Chile compatible 
with rural stagnation and a low level of economic development generally, while the interests 
of those who controlled (or had direct access to the patronage of) the very differently 
constituted South African state required a transformation to a more advanced capitalist order 
in town and countryside? 
In South Africa, in contrast to Chile, there were from the beginnings of industrial capitalism 
deep contradictions within the racially defined ruling bloc. It is in understanding the nature 
and origins of the racial order and the racial-democratic state that embodied it that we are 
likely to begin to understand the drive for capitalist transformation. Of crucial importance 
was the challenge posed from below by rising black productive elites, for example the 
sharecroppers of the high veld, many of whom were beginning to hire labour and thus 
become petty capitalists. Many of the beneficiaries of new opportunities for accumulation in 
the interstices of the early industrial economy were black people. Simultaneously, large 
numbers of rural whites found that they no longer had access to the resources necessary for 
independent existence. Older economic activities were either impermanent (like raiding, 
hunting and transhumant grazing) or were no longer viable once finance capital started 
surging through the countryside (like trade and transport). Important social groups which 
were incorporated (on the basis of racial belonging) in the hegemonic racial order were being 
robbed of their independent status and their control over accumulative resources. All over 
the place big capital ousted small capital. Thus many members of the racially defined ruling 
bloc were vulnerable to impoverishment and proletarianization. The radicalization and 
alienation of these elements were perceived as a grave threat to the hegemonic racial order as 
a whole. The way in which this profound disaffection was expressed was in a kind of racial 
populism, combining an explosive hostility toward both blacks and big capital. All this 
meant that there were profound imperatives driving the state to take up an activist role in the 
promotion of a more advanced, racially defined capitalism in both town and countryside. 
The drive for racial supremacy was the cement that held this hegemonic order together. And 
a political economy of racial supremacy could be secured and extended and elaborated only 
in an economy that was generating profits and wealth and privilege on an ever-expanding 
scale. 
Agrarian capitalism in South Africa developed within a social formation that was already 
formed in the crucible of industrial capital and as an integral part of a world that was already 
in an advanced stage of capitalist development. The profit-generating capacity of capitalist 
production was self-evident. The model of capitalist farming based on mechanized methods 
and proletarian labour had a powerful ideological hold as an ideal. 1341 Agrarian capitalism 
did not emerge willy-nilly as the contingent outcome of historically specific local 
developments. [35] It was imposed from above in a process of struggle under the auspices of 
a strong state. The state not only played the crucial role in creating the conditions for the 
entrenchment of capitalist property relations but also played a major role in supplying the 
money capital on the basis of which landholders could seize control of production and 
revolutionize productive processes. [36] Conceptualizing this racial-democratic state 
remains a task of the utmost importance. 
The development of a racially exclusive industrial economy, built on the capitalization of 
enterprise both rural and urban, cannot be asswned, it needs to be explained historically. 
What made it inevitable in South Africa's case was the fact that many who enjoyed 
privileged access to the resources of the state on the grounds of racial belonging (whatever 
the ultimate origins of and explanation for the nature of the state might be) were not the 
beneficiaries but the victims of the processes of primitive accumulation; and only a state- 
initiated - and sustained - process of capitalization and industrialization could save them from 
the consequences of their economic ineffectuality. 
Notes 
W Beinart, P Delius and S Trapido (eds), Putting a Plough to the Ground: 
accumulation and dispossession in rural South Africa 1870-1930 (Johannesburg, 
1986); T Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Amca: the 
southern Highveld to 1914 (London, 1987); H Bradford, A Taste of Freedom: the 
ICU in rural South Africa (New Haven, 1988); W Beinart and C Bundy, Hidden 
Struggles in Rural South A frica: politics and popular movements in the Transkei 
and eastern Cape 1890-1930 (London, 1987). See also special issue ofAfrica 
Perspective, 1,516 (1 987). 
E.g. M Morris, "Social History and the Transition to Capitalism in the South African 
Countryside", Africa Perspective, 1,516 (1987); B Freund, "Rural Struggles and 
Transformations", South African Historical Journal, 19 (1 987). 
M Morris, "The Development of Capitalism in SouthAfiican Agriculture: class 
struggle in the countryside", Economy and Society, 5,3 (1976). 
Morris, "Social History and the Transitioa to Capitalism in the South African 
Countryside", p 2 1. 
V I Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Collected Works, V013 
(Moscow, 1964). See G Cohen's comments in Karl Marx's Theory of History: a 
defence (Oxford, 1978), p 72. 
The revolutionary historical significance of capitalist productive relations is spelled out 
very clearly by R Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: a critique of neo- 
Srnithian Marxism", New Left Review, 104 (1977). Also see E Laclau, "Feudalism and 
Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, 67 (1971). 
R Hilton, "Capitalism - What's in a Name?" in R Hilton (ed), The Transition from 
Feudalism to Capitalism (London, 1976), p 149. 
This is a central thesis in M Dobb's seminar Studies in the Development of Capitalism 
(London, 1946). 
E Wolf's Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley, 1982) is an exceptionally 
clear exposition of the changing historical nature of merchant capital. 
E Fox-Genovese and E D Genovese, Fruits of Merchant Capital: slavery and 
bourgeois property in the rise and expansion of capitalism (Oxford, 1983), pp vii, viii. 
Also see G Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: a Marxist analysis (]London, 
1975), pp 104-05. Note Mm's words: "If we now talk of plantation-owners in 
America as capitalists ... this is due to the fact that they exist as anomalies within a 
world market based upon free labour." K Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations 
(London, 1964), p 119. Note that the analysis here is being rooted in the sphere of 
production rather than of exchange. See references in note 6 above on this crucial 
distinction. Some who have written on South Africa have followed a widespread but 
erroneous trend in confusing capitalism with production for long-distance markets. See 
D Denoon's important Settler Capitalism: the dynmics of dependent development in 
the southern hemisphere (Oxford, 1983); R Ross, "The Qrigins of Capitalist 
Agriculture in the Cape: a survey" in Beinart et a1 (eds), Putting a Plough to the 
Ground. 
Of course, the difficult problem of the precise mechanisms whereby 
 underdevelopment^' has underwritten, served the interests of, or been a prerequisite of 
capitalist development are still much disputed. See A Brewer, Marxist Theories of 
Imperialism: a critical survey (London, 1980). 
See T Keegan, "The Dynamics of Rural Accumulation in South Africa: comparative 
and historical perspectives", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 28,3 (1986), 
pp 628-29. 
The essential point about primitive accumulation is that it represents more than merely 
an accumulation of wealth. Money wealth (derived from commerce, financial dealings 
or speculation) had to be transformed before it became productive capital. In so far as 
productive capital is, firstly, a relationship of surplus appropriation, a property 
relationship, it requires the large-scale availability of labour power as a commodity, and 
the concentration of productive resources (most importantly land at first) in the hands 
of the holders of wealth. Primitive accumulation thus entails processes of dispossession 
as much as the accumulation of money wealth. In fact, in South Africa primitive 
accumulation of pre-capitalist wealth by settlers did not necessarily feed directly into 
capitalist production, and the intervention of the state was required in the twentieth 
century to provide the money capital necessary for capitalist transformation to proceed. 
But over a period of generations the preconditions had already been achievedi. the 
private appropriation of land and labour power as a result of dispossession. 
See, e.g., P Delius, "Migrant Labour the Pedi, 1840-188O", in S Marks and A Atmore 
(eds), Economy and Society in Pre-Industriul South Afbica (London, 1980); 
P Harries, "Kinship, Ideology and the Nature of Re-Colonial Labour Migration: labour 
migration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to South africa, up to 1895" in S Marks and 
R Rathbone (eds), IndusBaialisation and Social Chunge in South Africa: A_Fican 
class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870-1930 (London, 1982). 
T Keegan, "The Making of the Orange Free State, 1846- 1854: subimperialism, 
primitive accumulation and state formation", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 17,1(1988); S Trapido, "Reflections on Land, Ofice and Wealth in the South 
African Republic, 1 850- 19W, in Marks and Atmore (eds), Economy and Society in 
Breindustrial South Afrca; H Slater, "Land, Labour and Capitalism in Natal: the 
Natal Land and Colonisation Company, 1860- 1948", Journal of African History, 16,2 
(1975). 
Keegan, Rural Transformations, ch 2. 
P Delius, "Abel Erasmus: power and profit in the eastern Transvaal", and T Keegan, 
"White Settlement and Black Subjugation on the South African Highveld: the Tlokoa 
heartland in the northeastern Orange Free State, 1850-1914", both in Beinart et at (eds), 
Putting a Plough to the Ground. Also Keegan, "Dispossession and Accumulation in 
the South African Interior: the Boers and the Batlhaping of Bethulie, 1833-1861", 
Journal of African History, 28,2 (1987). 
B A Le Cordeur, The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism 1820-1854 (Cape Town, 
1981). 
Keegan, "The Making of the Orange Free State"; Trapido, "Reflections on Land, 
Office and Wealth in the South African Republic". 
Here is evidence of the fact that the precise shape of the productive system was never 
determined by the operation of merchant capital alone, but by local processes of 
struggle. Merchant capital was colour-blind, but the local colonial ruling classes it 
spawned identified themselves and structured their accumulative drives along racial 
lines. For recent restatements of the alternative view that the the origins of racial- 
supremacist policies are to be found on isolated and uncornmercialized frontiers - that 
they are a function of distance from markets and capitalist influences - see 
G Fredrickson, White Supremacy: a comparative study in American and South 
African history (Oxford, 198 1); and L M Thompson, The Political Mythology of 
Apartheid (New Haven, 1985). 
Keegan, "White Settlement and Black Subjugation". Of course, the opposite was 
happening as well: the rise of a stratum (particularly in the heart of the arable high 
veld) of highly commercialized black family farmers. Keegan, Rural 
Transformations, ch 3. 
Bradford, A Taste of Freedom. 
C Bundy, "Land and Liberation: popular rural protest and the national liberation 
movements in South Africa, 1920-1960" in S Marks and S Trapido (eds), The Politics 
of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa (London, 1987); 
Beinart and Bundy, Hi&n Struggles in Rural South Africa; W Beinart, "Chieftaincy 
and the Concept of Articulation: South Africa, ca 1900- 1950", Canadian Journal of 
African Studies, 19, 1 (1985). 
24 The life stories in T Keegan, Facing the Storm: portraits of black lives in rural South 
Africa (Cape Town, 1988), provide evidence of the ongoing importance of access to 
land in strategies of survival under apartheid. 
25 This transformation is evident in the history of Frasers, which began as a trading 
business in the grain-rich lowlands of Lesotho in the 1870s. Soon they had a large 
chain of stores, controlling a major share of the export trade in grain, and entered the 
grain-milling business. But by the 1890s they were also heavily involved in the 
recruitment of labour for the gold fields. During the twentieth century they 
increasingly transferred their business to the mining areas, and today the company, 
based inJohannesburg, owns a substantial string of concession stores and eating houses 
on the mines of South Africa, where migrants are encouraged to spend their money 
before setting off home on completion of their contracts. T Keegan, "Trade, 
Accumulation and Impoverishment: mercantile capital and the economic 
transformation of Lesotho and the Conquered Territory, 1870- 1920", Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 12,2 (1986). 
26 S Trapido, "'The Friends of the Natives': merchants, peasants and the political and 
ideological structure of liberalism in the Cape, 1854-1910" in Marks and Atmore (eds), 
Economy and Society in Pre-Zndushial South Afrca; C Bundy, The Rise and Fall of 
the South Afiican Peasantry, 2nd ed (London, 1988). 
27 Evidence on all this is analysed in Keegan, Rural Transformations, chs 3,5,6, and in 
Bradford, A Taste of Freedom, ch 2. Bradford argues that Morris is wrong in asserting 
that capitalism predominated in rural relations by the 1920s, characterizing relations as 
being dominated by processes of primitive accumulation. 
28 B Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democmcy: lord and peasant in the 
making of the modem world (London, 1967), remains the seminal recent study of the 
alternate paths to capitalism. Apart from Morris, another important use of the model in 
the South African context is S Greenberg, Race and Stute in Capitalist Development: 
South Africa in comparative perspective (Johannesburg, 1980). 
29 Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America". 
30 Morris, Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture", up. cif., p 196. 
210 
3 1 The main difference is that Prussian feudalism was discovered ready-made by 
metropolitan capital - which it pre-dated - which helped to preserve it while 
intensifying and commercializing it; whereas, in non-European areas of colonial 
settlement these productive systems were more directly the creations of merchant 
capital, and hence were feudal only in external appearance. 
32 T 0 Ranger summarized the findings of a 1978 conference on whites in Africa along 
these lines, in "White Presence and Power in Africa", Journal of African History, 20, 
4 (1979). Also see references in Keegan, "Dynamics of Rural Accumulation in South 
Africa", op. cit, pp 629-30. 
33 Denoon, op. cit, pp 86,89. 
34 Ross, in "Origins of Capitalist Agtriculture in the Cape", stresses the historical 
importance of this metropolitan ideal. 
35 See the comments of M Murray, "The Triumph of Marxist Approaches in South 
African Social and Labour History", Journal of Asian and African Studies, 23, 112 
(1988), p 86. 
36 It is certainly not the case, as is often assumed, that the ready availability of finance 
capital automatically and unproblematically leads to capitalist agriculture, as is 
commonly assumed. Agriculture, except in certain forms of capitalized plantation 
production, is likely to be quite unattractive to finance capital, especially under the 
conditions of arable farming in South Africa. 
